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Transforming (Private) Rights through
(Public) International Law: Readings on a




Straddlingboth thecentresof (European)powerand the shiftingdynamicsof thepost-Ottoman
world in a quest to guarantee private rights through public international legal redress, the PCIJ
Mavrommatis case provides a rich resource for interrogating the extent to which international
law during the League period could speak for voices on the edge of empire. In this article,
historical consideration of the regimes of empire and Mandate form the backdrop to an ex-
ploration into how international legal discourse (re)conﬁgured the relationship between the
core and the periphery, especially for those peoples awaiting the promise of self-determination
and sovereignty. The ﬁgure of a lone Greek investor and his dashed hopes in the newly created
Palestine Mandate is the backdrop to this tail of ever-shifting interpretations of public and
private rights, of speech as well as silence before and beyond the Peace Palace.
KeyWords
LeagueofNations;Mandate; Palestine; PermanentCourt of International Justice; public/private
distinction
1. INTRODUCTION
Few international lawyers are familiarwith the jurisprudential legacies bequeathed
by the three judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in
the Mavrommatis affair.2 If invoked at all, the case is most often used as authority
for the ability of states to represent the (private) rights of their nationals through
∗ Dr, BA (Hons)/LL B(Hons) (Sydney), PhD (ANU), School of International Relations, University of St Andrews,
Scotland [mb107@st-andrews.ac.uk]. This paper emerged out of a workshop held at Harvard Law School on
9October 2010 called ‘The League ofNations and theConstruction of the Periphery’. I would like to thank all
ofmy co-presenters as well as the invaluable comments from the participants. Thanks also to the comments
of two anonymous reviewers, as well as Sarath Kasthala, Gurchathan Sanghera, and Shogo Suzuki.
1 Perhaps because of his nationality, the travails of Euripides Mavrommatis with the British authorities in
London and Palestine are likened to thewanderings of the Greek hero Odysseus.Mavrommatis’s adventures
were far more mundane, but at times verged on the mythical in the face of British obfuscation. Quoted in
First Speech byMr H. Purchase, Counsel for Greece, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court,
Series C, No. 7, 1925, at 41.
2 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece/Britain), PCIJ Rep., (1924) Series A No. 2, (hereafter,
Mavrommatis (1924)); The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case (Greece/Britain), PCIJ Rep., (1925) Series
A No. 5 (hereafter, Mavrommatis (1925)); Case of the Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions
(Jurisdiction) (Greece/Britain), PCIJ Rep., (1927) Series A No. 11 (hereafter,Mavrommatis (1927)).
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diplomatic protection as a wrong incurred under state responsibility.3 More sus-
tained scholarship has provided detailed excurses into the innovative grounds used
to establish jurisdiction in the Court’s ﬁrst judgment as well as dicta on the nature
of treaty interpretation and deﬁnitions of ‘dispute’.4 This paper acknowledges such
contributions, but seeks to ask broader questions from this story of one frustrated
Greek investor, Euripides Mavrommatis.
Granted numerous concessions by the Sublime Porte to develop water supply
and electricity in Jerusalem on the eve of the GreatWar,5 Mavrommatis eventually
turned to his government to preserve these contracts under British rule in Man-
date Palestine. In its 1924 decision, the PCIJ determined that there was a dispute
between Greece (on behalf of its national) and Britain relating to interpretation of
Article 11 of theMandate. Greece alleged that a British grant of concessionary rights
under Article 11 conﬂicted with Mr Mavrommatis’s Ottoman-granted rights. In its
second judgment, the Court examined whether there was a conﬂict between the
two concessionary interests and found this to be the case, holding that Britainmust
continue to recognizeMrMavrommatis’s concessionary rights, even if in amodiﬁed
form under changed circumstances. Despite this determination, Greece initiated
a third hearing in pursuit of compensation for Britain’s alleged failure to readapt
Mavrommatis’s contract and the loss resulting from this. Perhaps in a bid to prevent
any further litigation, in its 1927 decision, the PCIJ reversed its 1924 position to
hold that Mavrommatis’s readapted concessions were strictly private in nature and
beyond its jurisdictional remit,which required a linkwith thenotionofpublicpower
under Article 11. Mr Mavrommatis thus gained the PCIJ’s assurance of his formal
contractual rights, but these were tomean very little in the informalworld of British
policies and politics in Palestine.
We can understand the shifting dynamics of this relationship betweenMavrom-
matis and the British authorities as well as the Court’s discretionary intercession
through the notion of core, periphery, and semi-periphery. This paper regards the
binary opposition of core and periphery as a fundamentally relational one, where
the self – or the core – gains awareness and identity through a contrast with its
other, the periphery. In the context of the League period, there are many possible
3 Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, at 12. In 1995, the International Law Commission turned its attention
to the matter of diplomatic protection with the aim of reaching agreement on a treaty text. According to
the Commission, ‘the customary origin [of diplomatic protection] was shaped by the dictum’ in the 1924
Mavrommatis case,UnitedNational Yearbook of the International LawCommission (1998), Part II, at para. 62. After
much debate on the viability of the ‘Mavrommatis ﬁction’, a modiﬁed deﬁnition of diplomatic protection
appears in Art. 1 of the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. See, in particular, A. Pellet, ‘The
Second Death of Euripide Mavrommatis? Notes on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on
DiplomaticProtection’, (2008)7TheLaw&Practice of InternationalCourts&Tribunals33. Foranoverviewof the
relationship between diplomatic protection, state responsibility, and theMavrommatis case, see J. Crawford,
‘The ILC’s Articles on Diplomatic Protection’, (2006) 31 S.Afr. YIL 19. Also see R. Portmann, Legal Personality
in International Law (2010), 66; and R. L. Astorga, ‘Nationality of Juridical Persons in the ICSID Convention in
Light of its Jurisprudence’, (2007) 11MPYUNL 419, at 427.
4 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (1958), especially at 34–5; O.
Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of Justice: The Rise of the International Judiciary
(2005), 191–206.
5 Concessions over Jaffa granted during thewar toMavrommatis were not recognized as valid by the PCIJ. See
N. Bentwich, England in Palestine (1932), 74.
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cores and peripheries. Following on from their overwhelming triumph across the
Middle East and playing the role of predominant League powers, Britain and France
take centre stage in this story of colonial continuity and change during the interwar
years. The core, then, is synonymous with the concentration of military, economic,
and discursive power that proﬁts at the expense of those on the periphery and this
paper tracks how the various readings of international law by the PCIJ were central
to the construction of the core/periphery relationship. In the following story, we
see that the further one moves – either geographically or discursively – from the
centre, the less able is one to be heard in the main League institutions, including
the PCIJ. The periphery is silenced by the centre through a number of techniques,
but here I trace how reliance on the public/private distinction provides an avenue
for the Court at various times to engage or deny a multitude of voices on the peri-
phery and semi-periphery. Under the newMandate System,Mavrommatis straddles
the periphery and the core in an ambivalent, semi-peripheral posture. The Court’s
initial endorsement of his private rights allows him signiﬁcant discursive and po-
tentially economicpowerover andbeyondmost subjects inPalestine.Mavrommatis
in this instance is permitted to proﬁt from the periphery but within the context of
British predominance. This article highlights howMavrommatis’s tightrope dance
becomes evermore difﬁcult under the terms of theMandate, which ultimately push
ZionistgroupswithinPalestine into thepositionof thesemi-periphery.With its1927
judgment, the Court displaces Mavrommatis onto the geographical and discursive
limits of international law by its characterization of the dispute as wholly private.
A close and critical reading of the case thus provides us with a lens through
which to see better the underlying dynamics of wealth and power at the core and
on the periphery as conceived by the Court and the League in Mandate territories.
In particular, this case spins a tale about the extent to which international law at
this time could listen to and then speak for individual (European) private rights in the
twilight of empire.6 This is the only PCIJ case that considered the nature ofMandate
administration and thus these three judgments will be examined as much for their
treatment of legal doctrine as for the Court’s construction of the Mandate regime.
BeingthereforetheonlycaseexploringtheresponsibilitiesofBritishruleinPalestine,
the case can also be read simultaneously as a narrative about the recognition and
denial of Mavrommatis’s rights set against the backdrop of a larger and silenced
story of those peripheral people in whose interests the Mandate was supposed to
act – the indigenous population of Palestine.
How can and how should international lawyers understand the legacies of the
PCIJwithin the interwar context?General appraisals of theperiod’s international in-
stitutional framework tend to straddle progressivist and conservative postures, pro-
voking many to underplay or overemphasize narratives of continuity and change.7
Were the League of Nations and its impetus new? Did the PCIJ embody a more
6 It must be noted here that a remarkably similar story is found in the Phosphates in Morocco case, which
would have concerned allegations of French bias against the interests of an Italian investor in the French
Protectorate had it been heard on themerits. Phosphates inMorocco (Italy/France), PCIJ Rep., (1938) Series A/B
No. 74.
7 Generally, see D. Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box’, (1999–2000) 32NYUJILP 335.
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lasting and positive approach to adjudication?8 Did the advent of the Mandates
signal the end of colonialism or simply European domination in a more subtle and
yet all-pervasive form? A wealth of scholarly material on the implications of inter-
national legal discoursewithinEurope during the timeof the PCIJ enables us only to
begin to answer such questions. Recent critical writings focusing on the periphery
have sought to shift our gaze away from adjudicative fora to concerns about the
governance and management of ‘backward’9 peoples by Mandatory powers before
the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC).10 Such work has highlighted the im-
portance of developmentalist discourses in the era before the UnitedNations in a bid
to reacquaint uswithpostcolonial technologies of intervention thatwere developed
during the interwar period. Supportive of a narrative that demonstrates inter-
national law’s ineluctable evolution from formalism to pragmatism, such scholar-
ship looks to legal technologies deployed in those spaces supportive of ﬂexibility
and sociological jurisprudence, such as the PMC.
Seemingly trapped ina jurisdictional bind that silenced thosevoicesof ‘protected’
natives, it iseasy tounderstandwhyaclosereadingofoneof thePCIJ’smost famously
‘doctrinal’ cases is best overlooked in the critical quest to bring the periphery back
in. This paper attempts to resurrect PCIJ jurisprudence, however, to highlight its
utility in answeringnot only formalist queries of doctrine, but also critical enquiries
into the continuities of colonialism. Here, I suggest that a close reading of this PCIJ
case indirectly concerned with the periphery deepens and supports recent critical
scholarship on the League period outside the Peace Palace. As in the case of the PMC,
herewe can explore hownew techniques formanaging non-European peopleswere
incubated and consolidated. Can we distinguish League ideals of ‘sacred trust’ from
earlier practices of ‘protection’ and colonialism?Whatwere the jurisdictional hooks
used by the PCIJ to ‘internationalize’ disputes andwhat facts andwhich peoplewere
recognized as being worthy of judicial oversight and especially international legal
redress?11 In particular, how were notions of development and ‘domestic’ public
authority constructed by the Bench and the Bar in this era of the ‘open (or only
slightly ajar) door’?
The central concern in this paper, then, is to chart the ways in which public and
private power are recognized (and thus legalized) within the courtroom. The main
methodological tool I apply to historical and legal debates as well as the case itself
is the public/private device. I seek to trace how various interpretations of public
and private power, law, and rights generate central and peripheral positions both
8 Flagged by Skouteris in thewake of theHagueConferences: T. Skouteris,TheNotion of Progress in International
Law Discourse (2010), 3.
9 Here, I draw inspiration from the title of Lindley’s classic treatise,The Acquisition andGovernment of Backward
Territory in International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion (1926).
10 Especially A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and theMaking of International Law (2005), Chapter 3, at 114–95;
andB.Rajagopal, InternationalLaw fromBelow:Development, SocialMovements andThirdWorldResistance (2003),
Chapter 3, at 50–72.
11 Of course, this idea of a matter’s international nature was the central issue confronting the PCIJ in the
Nationality Decrees case: Nationalities Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zones) on November 8th, 1921,
PCIJ Rep., (1923) Series B No. 4 (hereafter, Nationalities Decrees). For a critical rereading of the case, see N.
Berman, ‘TheNationality Decrees Case, or, of Intimacy and Consent’, (2000) 13 LJIL 265.
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within the discipline of international lawandwithin thenarrative I construct about
Mavrommatis and Mandate Palestine. Although cognizant of the polarizing and
simplifying tendencies of the public/private distinction, I also remain aware of its
illusive quality, as captured by Chinkin, because such concepts:
are complex, shifting . . . [to] reﬂect political preferences with respect to the level and
qualityof government intrusion. Since there isnoconstant, objectivebasis for labelling
an activity or actor as ‘private’, the judiciary regularly resorts to this as a device to avoid
ruling on political issues. This in turn obscures the ways in which government policy
regulates the so-called private sphere.12
By tracing the way in which the public/private distinction is used in these matters,
the following discussion explores what we can learn about the reach of inter-
national adjudication for peoples in the periphery. What alternative narratives
emerge between the lines of debate over the limits of jurisdiction and contractual
agreements?Howwas international lawas forgedwithin the PCIJ both enabling and
disabling for competing public and private rights (or international and domestic
spheres) in non-European territories? To what extent were the Mandate ideals of
‘sacred trust’ respected and afﬁrmed by proxy through the claims ofMavrommatis?
This paper will begin with an overview about the nature of colonial rule in the
Middle East and the establishment of theMandate System to interrogate depictions
of Palestine’s exceptionality. It then moves on to the Mavrommatis proceedings in
light of British rule. I read the case in light of the picture that emerges about the
international development project for peoples on the periphery. In particular, I trace
the way European international lawyers in the period ﬂexibly (re)interpreted the
boundaries between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’, ‘formal’ and ‘contextual’, and
‘public’ and ‘private’ in the pursuit or denial of legal redress. Despite its limited jur-
isdictional reach, international law did not simply cease tomatter on the periphery.
On the contrary, theMavrommatis case highlights theubiquity and complexity of in-
ternational law’s constraining or enabling qualities, whether for those at the centre
or on the periphery.
2. AFTER EMPIRE YET BEFORE INDEPENDENCE: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN MANDATES
With hindsight inevitably at our side, it is hard to step back into the shoes of
those participants of the Arab Revolt in Damascus between 1918 and 1920 and see
their aspirations for independence after Ottoman rule as little more than hopeless
naivety.As international lawyers, it isnotour task toenvisage the joy followedby the
disappointment resulting from French and British betrayal.13 Historical narratives
12 C. Chinkin, ‘A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension’, (1999) 10 EJIL 387, at 389.
13 Here, I am particularly referring to the promises contained in the Hussein–McMahon correspondence and
their denial by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Exchange of Letters between France andGreat Britain respecting
the Recognition and Protection of an Arab State in Syria, 9/6 May 1916, 221 CTS 323 (The Sykes–Picot
Agreement); and Exchange of Notes between France and Great Britain modifying the Agreement of 9/6 May
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tend to characterize the creation of the Mandate regime for Arab peoples as a rela-
tivelysimplecontinuationofcolonialismunderanothername,whereasmainstream
legal accounts tend to hail this era as a welcome break from colonial prejudice.
Critical scholarshipwithin international law has sought to drawmore on historical
studies while simultaneously reﬂecting on the self-image of a discipline dedicated
to notions of its ownprogress. Thus, criticalworkhas tended to highlight continuities
over change with a note of caution about the extent to which League projects can
be seen as distinct – and better – than their predecessors. According to Berman:
You simply can’t tellwhether the BerlinAct [of 1885] is better than theMandate System
by asking which has more sovereignty and which has more community – all such
regimes contain all the elements. The question is to what ends they have been put –
and to what extent the framework allows challenges to prevailing distributions of power
and wealth.14
We will see later on how the Mandate regime in Palestine did in fact augur in
certainnewopportunities for power andwealth in the changing dynamic of centre–
periphery relations. Before considering this speciﬁc case, however, I ask how inter-
national lawwas deployed in the region to integrate and subordinate peoples in the
(Middle Eastern) periphery. Canwe identify continuities of control across the region
at the dawn of the FirstWorldWar and, if so, what were these?
Applying critical insights to the case of the Arab world in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries allows us to explore dynamics of wealth and power
through the project of internationalization.15 In particular, wemust interrogate the
extent to which integration into the expanding international system both enabled
and constrained possibilities for self-rule. Moreover, we need to problematize no-
tions of ‘self’, too, as the states that would come to house peoples of the former
Ottoman Empire failed to reﬂect national sentiments. For many Arabs, it was the
simultaneous emasculation and ‘inclusion’ of the Ottoman Empire that ﬁrst in-
troduced modes of European control into their daily lives. As had been the case
for various Islamic empires, Ottoman rule relied on ﬂexible approaches to con-
trol over territory that derived much of their legitimacy from the Sultan occupy-
ing the position of Khalı¯fa, or successor to the Prophet.16 Shrinking capacity in
1916, 25/30May1916, 222CTS13.On the legal effects of the former agreement, seeV.Kattan,FromCoexistence
to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab–Israeli Conﬂict, 1891–1949 (2009), Chapter 4.
14 N. Berman, ‘In theWake of Empire’, (1999) 14 AUILR 1515 (First Annual Grotius Lecture, American Society
of International Law), at 1544 (emphasis added).
15 Here, I am particularly referring to scholars loosely linked through the Third World Approaches to Inter-
national Law (TWAIL) and/or general postcolonial sensitivities. For example, see Anghie, supra note 10; A.
Anghie et al. (eds.), The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (2003); D. P. Fidler,
‘A Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment, and the Standards of
Liberal, GlobalizedCivilization’, (2000) 35Texas ILJ 387; T. Gathii, ‘Alternative andCritical: TheContribution
of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory’, (2000) 41 Harv. ILJ
263; K. Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: ThirdWorld Voices in International Legal Discourse’, (1998) 16Wisc.
ILJ 353; C. Mie´ville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (2006); V. Nesiah, ‘Placing
International Law:White Spaces on a Map’, (2003) 16 LJIL 1; S. Pahuja, ‘The Postcoloniality of International
Law’, (2005) 46 Harv. ILJ 459; A. Riles, ‘The View from the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the
Architecture of Colonial International Law’, (1995) 6 Law and Critique 38.
16 The word ‘sultan’ ( ) is derived from the Arabic verb to rule or dominate over ( ), whereas ‘Khalifa’
( ) derives from the verbmeaning to succeed or follow ( ) (the Prophet).
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Istanbul was mirrored by greater European imperial appetites that sought either
the creation of protectorates or increasingly aggressive capitulation agreements
across Ottoman lands. Both techniques ﬂourished at the height of positivist inter-
national law that promised sovereignty while eroding multicultural expressions
of statehood.17 Being variously identiﬁed as an Ottoman subject or Greek national,
Mavrommatis’s fortunes exemplify this shift fromethnicdiversity tomorenarrowly
deﬁned ‘nation’-states after the First World War. This would play out especially in
Palestine where relative inter-communal harmony under the Ottomans gave way
to division and concomitant inequality under British rule. Membership in inter-
national society would thus require radical reshaping of former Ottoman lands
along territorial, political, economic, and cultural lines.
Behind a myriad of cession and protection agreements at this time were the dy-
namics of politics that allowed elastic applications of sovereignty to draw in and
ensnare various non-European peoples in an impossible civilizing dance.18 For ex-
ample, whether protectorate agreements were (private) contractual agreements or
constitutive of international (public) effects was something open to contention.
Within the jurisprudence of the PCIJ itself, we ﬁnd no clear position on the legal
nature or the legal effects of protectorates; instead, ‘they have individual legal char-
acteristics resulting from the special conditions underwhich theywere created, and
the stage of their development’.19 It is for this reason that Baty characterizes the very
idea of protectorates as ‘juridical monsters’ requiring never-ending reinterpretation
of their international legal capacities.20 In this way, such institutions were perman-
ently unstable21 and permanently open to international interpretation and, often,
interference. ‘The protectorate regime brought non-Europe into the system, while
simultaneously leaving it “au dehors”.’22
Perhaps the most important reason for creating agreements such as this was
not to deﬁne indigenous capacities publicly and internationally, but to ensure that
otherEuropeanpowerswouldbeprevented fromexploitingagiventerritory.Legally
speaking, this amounted toprotectionnot for the localpopulationsomuchas for the
European power against potential (European) interlopers. Anghie suggests we read
this period, then, as one of ﬂuid personality,23 in which non-European powers were
17 Generally, see Anghie, supra note 10, at Chapter 2.
18 In general, see my discussion in Boundaries of Discourse in the International Court of Justice: Mapping Arguments
in Arab Territorial Disputes (2009), Part II Introduction.
19 Nationalities Decrees, supra note 11, at 27. We can also regard the status of the City of Danzig as possessing
certain qualities of both mandates and protectorates. Although such terminology was not used, the Court’s
considerationof indigenous internal control, Polishcontrolof foreign relations, and thedifﬁcultyof separating
them captures one of the standard deﬁnitions of protectorates. The fact that this arrangement was created
under treaty for the League echoes a mandatory relationship. See Free City of Danzig and International Labour
Organization, PCIJRep., (1930)SeriesBNo.18.Also see JudgeAnzilotti’sdiscussionof thecity’s ‘self-governing’
capacity in his separate opinion, at 22.
20 T. Baty, ‘Protectorates andMandates’, (1921–22) 2 BYIL 109, at 114.
21 Berman, supra note 11, at 282.
22 Ibid., at 294.
23 ‘Europeanstatesadopteddifferentviewsofnativepersonality,dependingontheirowninterests.Theproblem
was that native personality was ﬂuid, as it was created through the encounter with a European state which
would inevitably “recognize” the capacity of the non-European entity according to its own needs’, Anghie,
supra note 10, at 79.
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sometimes afforded the limited capacity to form contracts at the private-law level
but not at the public international-law level:24 ‘The non-European states thus existed
in a sort of twilight world; lacking personality, they were nevertheless capable of
entering into certain treaties and were to that extent members of international
law.’25 These agreements acted as private contracts (often resulting from coercion)
whose international legal effects would only apply amongst public international
law’s subjects – European states.26
We see a shift, however, in this practice of private agreements to public inter-
national agreements in theArabworldﬁrst for the protectorate ofMorocco and later
in relation to the ‘A’ Mandates. Continuities between these regimes demonstrate
how the regime of the Mandate was not so new, whether for those at the colonial
centre or the ‘protected’ periphery. In a1922article exploring the intellectual origins
ofMandate principles, Potter links ‘open-door’ notions and even theword ‘Mandate’
itself to correspondence between Germany and the United States regarding the
1906 Treaty of Algeciras.27 Keen to ensure a space free from French or Spanish
preponderance vis-a`-vis trade concessions, the United States invoked the right of
most-favoured nation for foreign nationals in Morocco as contained in Article XVII
of the1880MadridConvention.28 Ina letter to theGermanemperor, theUSSecretary
of State, Elihu Root, surmised that:
If this arrangement is made, the Conference [of Algeciras] will have resulted in an
abandonment by France of her claim to the right of control in Morocco answerable
only to the two Powers with whom she had made treaties and without responsibility
to the rest of the world, and she will have accepted jointly with Spain a mandate from
all the Powers, under responsibility to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights
and opportunities. And the due observance of these obligations will be safeguarded
by having vested in another representative of all the Powers a right to have in their
behalf full and complete reports of the performance of the trust, with the further right of
veriﬁcation and inspection.29
The terms of the resulting Treaty of Algeciras were cited in a 1915 work read
by General Smuts,30 one of the central instigators of the Mandate regime.31 The
internationalization of the Moroccan protectorate would allow other European
24 According to Grewe, ‘the protagonists of colonial expansion in the nineteenth century did not deny non-
civilized peoples the dominium civile, but rather only political imperium; not the capacity to hold private, civil
rights, but rather legal personality as a subject of international law. They did not deny that every human
being had innate rights which were held independently of the stage of culture and civilisation they had
achieved’, W. H. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (translated byM. Byers) (2000), 548.
25 Anghie, supra note 10, at 76. This sense of twilight is captured by Andrews in his observation of a two-tier
international law of the nineteenth century between members and non-members of international society.
Shaw further divides the system into three: full members and states in the Concert of Europe, non-European
states, and non-European peoples not recognized as states. J. A. Andrews, ‘The Concept of Statehood and the
Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century’, (1978) 94 Law Quarterly Review 408, at 419; and M. N.
Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (1986), 45.
26 J. Castellino and S. Allen, Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis (2003), 91.
27 P. B. Potter, ‘Origin of the System of theMandates under the League of Nations’, (1922) 16 APSR 563.
28 Ibid., at 580.
29 Letter of Secretary Root to Baron Speck von Sternberg, 7 March 1906, cited in ibid., at 579 (emphasis added).
30 J. A. Hobson’s Towards International Government, discussed in ibid., at 574.
31 Generally, seeM.Mazower,NoEnchantedPalace: TheEnd of Empire and the IdeologicalOrigins of theUnitedNations
(2009), Chapter 1.
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powers greater access to its markets and a far more robust (public) legal apparatus
for enforcing (private) rights.32
As the greatest imperial power at the end of the GreatWar, Britain had to balance
its own imperialist designs on Ottoman lands with emerging notions supportive
of both the ‘open door’ and wardship for Arab governments-in-waiting. Although
some recognition can be given to humanitarian ideals in conceiving of theMandate
System of tutelage,33 we must not forget that much of the non-European world
remained under various forms of ‘protection’ or colonialism that neither France
nor Britain was ready to relinquish. Although Britain had favoured an informal –
and thus cheaper34 – approach to empire in much of the Arab world, we still
need to understand the relationship between Britain and various peoples under her
authority as an unequal one. Diplomatic dealings during the Great War35 and the
emergence of theMandate idea shouldnotmask the fact that, often, Britain regarded
its approach to Mandatory, colonial, or protectorate territories in a similar light.36
According to Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1919, ‘[t]here was no large difference
between the principles of the Mandate System and those of the Berlin Conference’
of 1885.37
As in the case of the Moroccan protectorate, the United States also played an im-
portant, if ultimately indirect, role in shaping the framework applicable to British
formerly Ottoman territories.38 Best known, of course, is the inﬂuence that Wilso-
nian ideals of self-determination had on curtailing imperial appetites, acting as a
compromise between the colonizer and the colonized.39 Britain was aware of the
need to appear respectful of an emerging strand in public opinion that regarded
dominion over foreign peoples as more than an exercise in aggrandisement.40 The
dividends of rulewould have to be balanced by the interests of other potentialWest-
ern economic interests (the ‘open’ door) as well as wardship of the native economy
and society.
32 For a discussion on the nature of the French Protectorate over Morocco, see Judge Van Eysinga’s dissenting
opinion in the Phosphates inMorocco case,whichhe argues is not a standard protectorate. Instead, ‘the casewe
have to consider is that of a State, whose international status is in a large measure determined by collective
conventions and which is under the protection of one of the States parties to these conventions’, supra note
6, at 32.
33 M. C. Mills, ‘TheMandatory System’, (1923) 17 AJIL 52.
34 E. B. Haas, ‘Conﬂicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System’, (1952)
6 IO 521, at 528.
35 On this, see especially D. K. Fieldhouse,Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958 (2006), Chapter 2.
36 For example, Darwin quotes Lord Balfour in 1918 as saying that ‘We will have a Protectorate [over former
Ottoman lands] but not declare it’, J. Darwin, ‘An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918–
1939’, (1999) 27 Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 159, at footnote 1.
37 Quoted in Berman, supra note 14, at 1526.
38 Generally, see Haas, supra note 34.
39 R. Heacock, ‘Le syste`me international aux prises avec le colonialisme: Les de´liberations sur la Palestine dans
la commission permanente des mandates de la socie´te´ des nations’, in N. Me´ouchy and P. Sluglett (eds.), The
British and FrenchMandates in Comparative Perspective (2004), 129–42, at 130.
40 According toMazower, ‘[b]ridging the gap betweenWashington and theDominionwas crucial. As itwas, the
ideaof turning formerGermanandOttomanpossessions intoLeaguemandates turnedout tobean ingenious
way of squaring the circle between the British Dominions’ demand to annex former German colonies and
the need to pay lip service toWilsonian idealism’, Mazower, supra note 31, at 45.
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We can note this sense of quid pro pro between the United States and Britain
in exchanges that occurred in the lead-up to the creation of the Mandates. Motiv-
ated by designs over Iraqi oil as well as concern for peripheral populations, the US
government repeatedly requested that Britainwould ‘assure equal treatment in law,
and in fact to the commerce of all nations’.41 The United States would accept the
British presence in former Ottoman lands because of its ‘recognition of the justice
and far-sightedness’ of theMandateSystem.TheUnitedStateshad tolerated (private)
British use and development of natural resources during the period of its military
occupation. The Mandate regime, however, would require that all interests in oil
and commerce be equally indulged in a display of public oversight. Thus, theUnited
States requested and was given British assurances that, before the establishment of
the Mandates, no monopolistic concessions would be granted and that all conces-
sion and exploration grants would be publicized. Furthermore, Britain agreed to
respect the private rights arising from concessions granted by the Ottomans before
the outbreak of war. These assurances were reinforced in the Anglo-American Con-
vention of 1922, which, in Article 3, stated that ‘Vested American property rights
in the mandated territory shall be respected and in no way impaired’.42 These very
issues formed the core ofMavrommatis’s grievances before theCourt andwill be dis-
cussed in the next section. They are also strikingly similar to the Treaty of Algeciras
protectorate regime for Morocco.
Before exploring how these principles would be realized in the case of Palestine,
wemustﬁrst come full circle in theﬁnal part of this sectionandexplore the extent to
which theMandate regimecanbe regardedasdistinct from its colonial predecessors,
such as protectorates. Often, this issue has been approached through the lens of
‘sovereignty’, which, with its elastic meaning,43 has allowed a raft of arguments
to be made about the non-imperial nature of nations in a state of abeyance.44 For
Lauterpacht, sovereignty of the Mandate territory lay with both the League and
the Mandatory power, and, consequentially, Mandate territories could not simply
be subsumed under the territory of the Mandatory, as was often the case with
protectorates.45 Crawford’s discussion ofmainstreamopinion afﬁrms Lauterpacht’s
position. Crawford shows that the dominant narrative distinguished colonial rule
from theMandates; France andBritain, for example, didnot possess sovereignty over
these territories.46 Instead, sovereignty was held ‘in trust’ by the League, especially
41 Letter to Lord Curzon from US Ambassador in London, John Davis, 12 May 1920, Correspondence between
His Majesty’s Government and the United States Ambassador Respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories,
British Government Document, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1921), at 1.
42 ‘Convention between the United States and Great Britain respecting Rights in Palestine’, (1926) 20 AJIL 65,
at 72.
43 In particular, seeM. Koskenniemi, FromApology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2005),
Chapter 4.
44 Especially see N. Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law’, (1988–89) 7
Wisc. ILJ 51.
45 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Mandate under International Law in the Covenant of the League of Nations’, in E.
Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, Vol. 3 (1977), 29–84, at 49.
Cf. Hales,who argues that ‘sovereignty is not vested in any single body’, J. C.Hales, ‘SomeLegalAspects of the
Mandate System: Sovereignty–Nationality–Termination and Transfer’, (1937) 23 Transactions of the Grotius
Society 85, at 94.
46 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006), 573.
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in relation to ‘A’-class mandates of the former Ottoman Empire at the highest stage
of ‘native’ development.47 Such accounts are seminal for a discipline grounded in
notions of international legal ‘progress’: we can look to the Mandates System as a
break from the colonial past and as a prelude to the exercise of self-determination
in the period of decolonization.
For critical authors, the Mandates continued the trend of European domination
through international law, but in a far more interventionist form, highlighting
simultaneous ruptures aswell as continuities in the conﬁgurations of domination.48
It was:
precisely because sovereignty over the mandate territory could not be located in any
one entity that agents of the Mandate (for example, the Mandatory, the PMC and
perhaps the PCIJ) could have complete access to the interior of that territory.49
As in the case of ﬂexible interpretations of the nature of ‘sovereign’ territories in the
Middle East before theGreatWar,we also see in this periodnewways of shaping and
speakingof sovereignty toserve the interestsofempireandthe ‘development’ofnon-
European peoples on the periphery. Although cut off from any direct contact with
political machinations through its own institutional conﬁnes, we will see below
how the PCIJ supported and reinforced these prevailing inequalities in Palestine and
beyond.
3. NEITHER EXCEPTIONAL NOR PERIPHERAL: THE CLAIMS OF
MAVROMMATIS IN THE CONTEXT OF 1920S MANDATE
PALESTINE
3.1. Tracing patterns of continuity and change in earlyMandate Palestine
As in the case of scholarship exploring the (un)exceptional nature of the League of
Nations, ambivalence lies at theheart ofhistorical and legal accountsof thePalestine
Mandate, torn as they often are in trying to marry the undeniable speciﬁcities of
the case with broader trends about the nature of colonial rule.50 Wedged between
hundreds of years of former Ottoman rule and the creation of the state of Israel
in 1948, this period tends to be characterized as a transitional (or even peripheral)
one with little enduring signiﬁcance for understanding more contemporary legal
or political developments.51 Because Israel’s establishment afﬁrmed the presence of
47 Generally, see Art. 22, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, 225 CTS 188. Norman Bentwich goes
so far as to characterize the Mandate system as a form of ‘noblesse oblige in the national as well as in private
affairs’, N. Bentwich, ‘Mandated Territories: Palestine andMesopotamia (Iraq)’, (1921–22) 2 BYIL 48, at 49.
48 ‘Whereas previously the internal character of the sovereign European state was immune from scrutiny, in
the inter-war period it was precisely through the Mandate System that international law and institutions
had complete access to the interior of a society. It was in the operations of the Mandate System, then, that
it became possible for law not merely to enter the interior realm, but also to create the social and political
infrastructure necessary to support a functioning sovereign state’, Anghie, supra note 10, at 135–6.
49 Ibid., at 148–9.
50 For a good example of the Palestine-as-exception narrative, see W. E. Rappard, ‘Mandates and Trusteeships
with Particular Reference to Palestine’, (1946) 8 JP 520, at 520–6.
51 A. Likhovski, ‘Between “Mandate” and “State”: Re-Thinking the Periodization of Israeli Legal History’, (1998)
19 Journal of Israeli History 39, at 41.
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a Jewish nation-as-state, scholarship especially within Israel has tended to overlook
non-Jewish institutions and actors in this period or to place them on the periphery
of academic analysis.52 I argue in this section that it is crucial to understand the
experiencesnotonlyofone individual straddling the semi-periphery,Mavrommatis,
but of the rulers and the ruled inPalestine aspart of complexandoften contradictory
local and international events.53 It is all too easy to read history backwards here and
plot out a determinist narrative, but, as we cannot simply speak of two nationalist
narratives – Israeli and Palestinian – so we cannot reify two national groups in the
Mandate period. Factors of class, gender, religious afﬁliation, the urban/rural divide,
and language all muddied the waters between the Mediterranean and the Jordan.54
Here, I consider the legal and economic context inwhichMavrommatis tried in vain
to conduct his business, the League of Nations’ Mandate of Palestine.
To situate the case within its ideational milieu, I draw on some writings of key
British ofﬁcials in the period, which all display a number of themes common to
general Mandate goals, including an idealistic zeal to ‘develop’ ‘primitive’ peoples
through the introduction of economic efﬁciency and integration into the market.
In particular, I interrogate these documents for the way they construct images
about the core/periphery relationship in Mandate Palestine. How were allocations
of wealth and power understood and justiﬁed by these individuals? How did their
orientalizing discourse create as well as destroy relations between the Mandatory
and theMandated as well as between Jews and Arabs themselves?
The PalestineMandate’s founding documentwas conﬁrmed by the LeagueCoun-
cil in 1922 and came into force a year later, combining general League goals for ‘A’
Mandates as well as the particular dynamics of British aspirations for this territory
carved out of bilaad as-shaam (Greater Syria). Although Britain would be holding
the territory on trust for the League, the realities of its physical presence there since
December 1917 meant that the 1922 document did not simply mark a break with
dynamics created during itsmilitary occupation.55 Throughout this ‘interim’ period
of civil administration under High Commissioner Samuel and despite assurances
52 Ibid.
53 For Bunton, in his study of land policies inMandate Palestine, the ‘need for a broader, comparative approach
has not generally been recognised in the literature on the land in Palestine which instead has shown a
tendency to accentuate theuniqueness of the period’ (at 4). Throughout his study, he argues that ‘British land
policies in Palestine were constantly in ﬂux, and are best understood in terms of wider frames of reference
which recognizeproperty as aﬂuid social construction, informedasmuchormoreby structures andpatterns
inherited from the Ottoman past and by assumptions about changing realities on the ground, than by those
idealized and imported from London. This may be little more than the established historical practice of
balancing continuity and change, but it has not always been brought to bear in the study of land inmandate
Palestine’, M. Bunton, Colonial Land Policies in Palestine 1917–1936 (2007), 5–6.
54 On all of these points regarding historical method, see ‘Introduction’, I. Pappe´, A History of Modern Palestine:
One Land, Two Peoples (2006), 1–12.
55 Palestine’s Chief Justice between 1921 and 1927 thus related this transition period in the following terms:
‘TheGovernmentDepartmentswere developed. Although theGovernmentwas in forma civil one, Palestine
was still held by the power of the sword. There had been no cession of the territory by Treaty. That state of
things went on until September 11, 1922, when Sir Herbert [Samuel] took the Oaths of Ofﬁce and Allegiance
at a ceremony of some historical interest, when the King’s Proclamation was read and His Majesty assumed
control, not as conqueror of Palestine, but as having accepted authority under the Mandate. The conquest
was a fact. His acceptance of authority under the Mandate was the realization in formal terms of a political
idea. TheMandate was a sort of constitution, conferring limited powers of government; but under the shadow
of the sword the King had already set up a government in civil form in July, 1920’, T. W. Haycraft, ‘Palestine under
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to the United States of not making signiﬁcant changes, Britain did indeed set to
work on reshaping the legal, political, and economic landscape of the territory. The
British froze all land transfers in the ﬁrst three years of control to ensure that future
developmentwould take placewithin the framework of amore robust andmanage-
able form of land ownership than that bequeathed by the Ottomans.56 This was not,
however, a wholesale break with the past, in spite of the desires of Palestine’s ﬁrst
Attorney-General, Bentwich, who, in 1921, wanted to discard the ‘damnosa hereditas’
of the Ottoman Empire, which had ‘clogged . . . reforming activity’ since Britain’s
occupation.57 Recent scholarship has highlighted how Britain drew on extant Otto-
man laws in sometimes innovative ways to achieve its policy aims of ‘developing
the local people off the land’.58 The complex system of Ottoman land tenure was
reconﬁgured so that smallholders often lost their access to communal lands, while
cadastralmapping allowedgreater dominationover and taxationof lands that could
then be integrated into the market economy.59 Earlier laws were not removed so
much as reworked so that it is best to ‘re-imagine British rule over Palestine not as
a rupturewith, but rather in many areas a continuation of, the dynamics of Ottoman
rule’.60
According to Likhovski, one ‘major inconsistency in colonial policy was the con-
tradiction between development and status quo, modernization and tradition’.61
The contemporaneous writings of British ofﬁcials are drenched in classic colonial
imagery, evocative of ‘undeveloped and under-populated’62 lands just ‘waiting to be
developed’63 by the industry and effort of the settler colonialist.64 High Commis-
sionerSamuelregardedtheagriculturalpracticesofthelargelyArablocalpopulation
as generally ‘primitive’ and the words of Haycraft deepen such cultural stereotypes
theMandate’, (1928) 15 Journal of the Central Asian Society 167, at 170 (emphasis added). For background on Sir
Herbert Samuel as ﬁrst High Commissioner, see B.Wasserstein, ‘Herbert Samuel and the Palestine Problem’,
(1976) 91 English Historical Review 753.
56 M. LeVine, ‘Land, Law and the Planning of Empire: Jaffa and Tel Aviv during the Late Ottoman andMandate
Periods’, in H. I˙slamog˘lu (ed.), Constituting Modernity: Private Property in the East and West (2004), 100–46, at
115; N. Bentwich, ‘The Legal Administration of Palestine under the BritishMilitary Occupation’, (1920–21) 1
BYIL 139, at 146. See alsoW. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939 (1987), Chapter 1 and especially
39–47.
57 Bentwich, supra note 47, at 53.
58 LeVine, supra note 56, at 104.
59 Generally, see Bunton, supra note 53; M. Bunton, ‘Inventing the Status Quo: Ottoman Land-Law during the
Palestine Mandate, 1917–1936’, (1999) 21 International History Review 28; and R. Shehadeh, ‘The Land Law of
Palestine: An Analysis of the Deﬁnition of State Lands’, (1982) 11 Journal of Palestine Studies 82.
60 LeVine, supra note 56, at 102 (emphasis added). According to Likhovski, there were many elements at
play during this period of legal reform, which reveal ‘the importance of paying attention to afﬁnities and
similarities, ﬁssures and gaps that undermine the colonizer/native dichotomy’ (at 7). Much of Ottoman law
hadbeencodiﬁedalongFrenchcivil-lawlinesand,under theBritish, a common-lawsystemwasstrengthened
through a policy of ‘Anglicization’ of the legal system, A. Likhovski, Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine
(2006), 23.
61 Ibid., at 55.
62 H.Samuel, ‘AnInterimReportontheCivilAdministrationofPalestineduring theperiodof1st July,1920–30th
June, 1921’, London: British Government Document, at 4.
63 Haycraft, supra note 55, at 186.
64 In this section, I particularly relyon thewritingsofNormanBentwich, theﬁrstAttorney-General inPalestine,
1922–31; Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice in Palestine, 1921–27; and Herbert Samuel, ﬁrst High Commis-
sioner in Palestine, 1920–25.
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in warning that ‘it should be kept in mind that in the Near East racial and religious
passions are elemental’.65 To keep these forces at bay:
[the]ultimatesuccessof thecolonialexperimentwouldseemtodependonthephysique
and temperament of the [European] colonists, [rather] than ability to maintain with
patience a persistent industry, for . . . remuneration . . . in relation to the requirements
of European habits of life, in a climate which, except in the hill country does not
encourage persistent physical activity.66
For British policymakers, then, it was not simply the creation of the Balfour De-
claration in 1917 that impelled racist and discriminatory rule in Palestine; ‘anti-
Semitism’67 at home along with colonial prejudices about the nature of the local
Arabpopulationproduced the framework for rule inPalestine thatmarried theMan-
date model with settler colonialism as well as development with the status quo.68
For Fieldhouse, this was ‘unique in British imperial history’, as, for the ﬁrst time,
the models of colonies of settlement and colonies of occupation were combined
with the additional adage thatmost of these settlers were not British subjects.69 The
Jews of Palestine straddled colonized and colonizing discourses that spoke to Jewish
otherness vis-a`-vis the ‘British’ core, yet superiority in relation to the Palestinian
Arabs on the periphery. At times it made sense for Zionists to link themselves with
their Semitic siblings in ‘sentimental idealization of the [Bedouin] noble savage’.70
At other times, the backwardness and ignobility of the Arab were to be lamented in
tones very much akin to that of classic colonizing rhetoric:
These blended feelings of familial afﬁnity and paternalist superiority were embodied
in the Zionist claim that the Palestinian Arabs, or ‘Arabs of the Land of Israel’, as they
were called,were thedescendentsof ancientHebrewswhohadbeencutoff fromJewish
civilization and slowly developed, preserving shards of ancient Hebrew customs and
language.71
Thus, the Yishuv would act as a civilizing instrument for the British through its
unique cultural link to the indigenous population of Palestine in a semi-peripheral
position. In addition and in contrast to the British preference elsewhere for indirect
rule via co-optation of local rulers, the direct rule of theColonialOfﬁcewas required
65 Samuel, supra note 62, at 4; and Haycraft, supra note 55, at 179.
66 Haycraft, supranote 55, at 181. Itmust be noted that themain population centres of new Jewish immigration
were not in the hills as much as the coastal plain around centres such as Haifa and Tel Aviv.
67 It is important to note that bothArabic andHebrew are Semitic languages and thus it seems strange to speak
of Arab-instigated ‘anti-Semitism’. We need to understand the progeny of this term within the context of
nineteenth-century Europe and various nationalisms incapable of respecting a place for Jews in the polity.
According to Shimoni, it ‘is not a coincidence that the code-word for Jew-hatred that became current from . . .
the mid-1870s was “anti-Semitismus”, as it has remained to this day. So-called “Semitism” was an invented
image related to the occidental construction of the so-called “Orient”’, G. Shimoni, ‘Postcolonial Theory and
the History of Zionism’, (2007) 13 Israel Affairs 859, at 861.
68 For a discussionon the links betweenBritain’s support for Zionismand anti-Semitic prejudiceswithinpolicy
circles, see Kattan, supra note 13, at Chapter 1.
69 Fieldhouse, supra note 35, at 117. This is noted in the 1925Mavrommatis pleadings: ‘one would not wish to
be thought that we were here by reason of any desire to beneﬁt ourselves or to beneﬁt our own nationals’,
Speech by Sir D. Hogg, Counsel for Britain, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series C,
No. 7, February 1925, at 101.
70 D. J. Penslar, ‘Zionism, Colonialism and Postcolonialism’, (2001) 20(2–3) Journal of Israeli History 84, at 86.
71 Ibid., at 87.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Feb 2014 IP address: 129.215.149.97
TRANSFORMING (PRIVATE) RIGHTS THROUGH (PUBLIC) INTERNATIONAL LAW 887
to undergird the pledge of support for a ‘Jewish national home’.72 Thus, according to
theunder-secretaryof theColonialOfﬁce in1922, ‘in allmatters relating toPalestine,
we stand under the shadow of the Balfour Declaration’.73
The terms, then, of theLeague’s PalestineMandatemustbeunderstoodas express-
ing both unique qualities resting on the Balfour Declaration and general Mandate
principles of well-being and development. The Balfour Declaration was included
in the Preamble and its premise can be traced throughout the Treaty, especially in
relation to support given for thepublic roleof the JewishAgency inadministering the
territory.74 As a whole, the text rests on a bifurcated view of development – one re-
liant on the public/private distinction: political participation and enterprise for the
(European) Jewish75 people in contrastwithpassive PalestinianArab ‘inhabitants’.76
A different relationship with the land itself is even constructed in the document so
that the Palestinian Arab population is expected tomaintain age-old customswhile
the administration is to encourage the ‘close settlement by Jews on the land, including
State lands andwaste lands not required for public purposes’.77 This public-law docu-
ment endowed certain subjects with private-law rights over and above claims of the
majority. Thus:
once it came into force [The Mandate] institutionalized . . . inequality in the status of
the Jewish and Arab communities: the British Administration was given the positive
obligation to ‘facilitate’ the JewishNationalHomebutwas obligated only to ‘safeguard’
the civil and religious rights of the rest of the population.78
Thenatureofthesepoliciescanbeunderstoodthroughthelensofsettlercolonialism,
which Smith deﬁnes as resting on the pillars of immigration, a land base, and
laws providing for special treatment.79 The third provision here is particularly
important, as Britain initially interpreted its general obligations of development as
72 Bentwich states that a ‘national home connotes a territory inwhich a people, without receiving the rights of
political sovereignty,hasnevertheless, a recognized legalpositionandreceives theopportunityofdeveloping
its moral, social, and intellectual ideals’, N. Bentwich, ‘TheMandate for Palestine’, (1929) 10 BYIL 137, at 139.
73 Evelyn Shuckburgh, quoted in B. J. Smith,The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy 1920–1929
(1993), 118.
74 The Preamble in part reads: ‘Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory
should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by
the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done
whichmight prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; andWhereas recognition has thereby been
given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting
their national home in that country’ (emphasis added). Also seeArts. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11. Note the differing nature of
rights recognized to Jews (political, national, and historical) and Palestinian Arabs (civil and religious). Also
note the quintessentially private image evoked by the term ‘national home’ placed within a (public) treaty
text.
75 The extent to which European (or Ashkenazi) Jews were seen and saw themselves as agents of European
development is signiﬁcant. Non-European (or Mizrahi, Sephardi, ‘Oriental’) Jews were often regarded as a
threat to the Zionist project because of their ‘backward’ cultural tendencies. See E. Shohat, ‘Sephardim in
Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims’, (1988) 19/20 Social Text 1.
76 J. Strawson, Partitioning Palestine: Legal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian–Israeli Conﬂict (2010), 48–9.
77 Art. 6, Palestine Mandate (emphasis added). This notion of ‘close settlement of the land’ is repeated in Art.
11, discussed below.
78 Smith, supra note 73, at 13.
79 Ibid., at 116.
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being fulﬁlled through its supportofZionist industryandagriculture, asexempliﬁed
by theﬁgureofMavrommatis’s rival, PinhasRutenberg.80 Until 1925, itwas assumed
that the Palestinian population could simply learn by Zionist example.81 Although
Bentwich, Samuel, and Haycraft maintained a deep-seated faith in the potential for
all peoples to ﬂourish under the terms of the Mandate,82 ever more pronounced
economic and political divisions and inequalities83 would coalesce into violence
and then civil war under Britain’s tutelage.84
3.2. Investing in the private and appealing to the public: the Mavrommatis
proceedings
The fortunes of Euripides Mavrommatis provide a striking example of how these
particular Mandate ideals played out in their domestic and international legal di-
mensions. Mavrommatis, variously identiﬁed as a Greek or Ottoman subject on the
eve of the First World War, was granted a number of concessions by the Sublime
Porte to undertake infrastructure projects in Jaffa and Jerusalem. The outbreak of
hostilities forced a halt to all construction, but, soon after the war’s end, Mavrom-
matis planned to resume work and so he made various communications with the
newly established British authorities regarding his subsisting private rights. Over
the course of a decade, Mavrommatis tried various avenues of redress in the face of
many obstacles, sometimes seeking compensation and sometimes seeking to real-
ize and readapt the terms of the contracts in the shifting environment of Mandate
Palestine.85 We can understand his place within the Mandate context as simultan-
eously both central andperipheral to the conﬁgurations ofwealth andpower.When
able to speak the language of (public) international law,Mavrommatis commanded
a central position in negotiating his claims. When unable to convince the Court
about the international and public nature of (private) grievances, however, we see
that, very quickly, Mavrommatis was ﬂung out to the peripheral reaches of the
80 For part of the intertwined story of these two investors, see M. Naor, ‘An Electrifying Story’, Ha’Aretz, 25
January 2004, available online at www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/an-electrifying-story-1.111974.
81 Smith, supra note 73, at 7–8.
82 In thewords of Bentwich, ‘Industries hitherto unknown in Palestine foundhere a newhome, obtaining their
motive power from the electric station of Rutenberg, their capital from the bourgeois [European, Jewish]
immigration, and their human power from the settlers who brought with them a new skill and new crafts’,
Bentwich, supra note 5, at 118–99.
83 For a consideration of the differences that developed between the two communities in this period, see R.
Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (2007), 9–22.
84 Notably, the riots of 1920, 1921, and 1929; the Arab Revolt of 1936–39; and thewar of late 1947–May 1948. In
relation to the conﬂict of 1947–49, revisionist authors deﬁne theperioduntilMay1948 as a civilwar between
Palestinians, the Yishuv and British forces before turning internationalwith thewithdrawal of British troops,
the declaration of the state of Israel, and the intervention of Arab states in the ﬁghting. For example, see A.
Shlaim, The IronWall: Israel and the ArabWorld (2000), Chapter 1.
85 According to Politis, ‘la readptation . . . n’est pas pratiqement possible. Elle ne l’est pas, car, comme il a e´te´
explique´ dans l’expose´ des faits, comme j’ai essaye´ de le faire moi-meˆme, par suite de la politique adopte´e
par le Gouvernement britannique en Palestine – dont les concessions accorde´es a` M. Rutenberg, en 1921,
constituent laprincipale et laplus charcte´ristiquemanifestation–, il s’est cre´e´ dans cepaysune telle situation
de fait que,malgre´ lameilleurevolonte´duGouvernementbritannique,dont jenedoutepas,M.Mavrommatis
se trouvedans l’impossibilite´mate´riellede faireaujourd’huicequ’il auraitpu faireau lendemainde laguerre’,
Mr N. Politis, Counsel for Greece, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series C, No. 7,
February 1925, at 74.
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silenced majority. Confronting Mavrommatis in his venture were the conﬂicting
(and antecedent) claims of Pinhas Rutenberg, who had been granted extensive con-
cessions for the development of hydroelectricity across Palestine even before the in-
auguration of theMandate and in the face of British undertakings to the contrary.86
Thenewpolitical andcultural contextof theMandatewouldmeanthat, increasingly
so, it was Rutenbergwhowas able to steer a course from the semi-periphery into the
central chambers of power.
Not only would the granting of these rights provide us with three PCIJ cases, but
they were instrumental in the reconﬁguration of power and wealth in theMandate
context. According to Smith:
the Rutenberg concession, which granted extraordinarymonopolistic rights to exploit
. . . natural resources and to operate public utilities, was an important milestone in
the politics of the economic policy, not only in the prestige it accorded the Zionist
movement but also in the violent opposition it provoked.87
Harking back to our discussion of the Balfour Declaration, Shuckburgh of the Colo-
nial Ofﬁce declared that:
The Rutenberg concession has always been regarded as the most practical example of
the policy of setting up a National Home for the Jews. It is so regarded by the Zionists
themselves. We are always trying to divert the attention of the Zionists from [public]
political to [private] industrial activities, andpreaching to them fromthe text that their
best chance of reconciling the Arabs to the Zionist policy is to show them the practical
advantages accruing to the country from the Zionist enterprise. For these reasons we
have supported and encouraged Mr Rutenberg’s projects and I submit that we must
continue to support and encourage them, so far as circumstances permit.88
To understand how British Mandatory rule reconﬁgured the distribution of wealth
and power for Mavrommatis as well as Palestine nationals, I compare and contrast
the strategies of argument used at the Bench and the Bar throughout the three pro-
ceedings. In particular, I explore how the public/private dichotomywas deployed in
variously formalist and contextualist manoeuvres both to limit and to expand the
scope of PCIJ, and thus League, oversight of the territory. What was the extent of
international legal intervention here? How did the PCIJ interpret and afﬁrm Man-
date constructions of development and well-being? Whether within the conﬁnes
of the Peace Palace or Palestine, who were the winners and the losers in the dis-
cursive boundaries constructed through the shifting notions of core and periphery?
Although the PCIJ was conﬁned by the particular claims brought by Greece and
86 Generally, Greece, in its pleadings, argued that the policies of the Britishwere formulated before theMandate
as soon as it assumed control there. See ibid., at 57. Bentwich, theﬁrstAttorney-General inMandate Palestine,
evenmentioned ameeting betweenMrChurchill, Secretary of State for theColonies, and Rutenberg in 1921,
where it ‘was decided inprinciple’ that Britainwould grant extension concession rights to develop electricity
in Palestine to Rutenberg. According to Bentwich, the ‘scheme opened possibilities of irrigation on a large
scale, and also of industrial development; and it was to become the symbol of the struggle between the
demand for progress in Palestine and the sentiment for maintaining the Holy Land in its pristine simplicity’,
Bentwich, supra note 5, at 64. For a consideration of Rutenberg’s connection to Palestine, see S. Reguer,
‘Rutenberg and the Jordan Valley: A Revolution in Hydro-Electricity’, (1995) 31Middle Eastern Studies 691, at
709.
87 Smith, supra note 73, at 118.
88 Quoted in ibid.
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Britain in each of the three proceedings, the case as a whole was united by the con-
test overwhen and how international law can guarantee the interests of individuals
situated at the interface between core, colonialist institutions, and peripheral sub-
ordination. This, of course, is the classic, textbook account of theMavrommatis case,
but we will see that, rather than providing a comforting formula, this dispute high-
lights the ever-changing and contingent nature of rights and responsibilities at the
national and international level.
The central question in the 1924 case turned on the Court’s jurisdiction. It was
alleged that Mavrommatis’s rights had been frustrated by the British grant of con-
cessions to Rutenberg. Mavrommatis invoked British undertakings to maintain Ot-
toman contracts as ensuring the continuing validity of his concessionary rights to
develop water and electricity works in the territory. Despite Mavrommatis’s status
as a (private) individual, the Court characterized the matter as sufﬁciently inter-
national (and public) through its well-known formula:
By taking up the case of one its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
rights – its rights to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.89
AstheRutenbergconcessionsweregrantedbytheBritishunderthepowersconferred
by theMandate in respect of publicworks (Article 11), jurisdiction could be founded
in relation to disputed interpretation of this provision.90 Article 26 provided:
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Manda-
tory and anothermember of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the
application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by
negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Under these two provisions, the Court could not consider theMavrommatis conces-
sions per se. Instead:
[the] question before the Court is whether by granting the Rutenberg concessions –
which cover at least a part of the same ground – the Palestine and the British author-
ities have disregarded international obligations assumed by the Mandatory, by which
obligations Greece is entitled to beneﬁt.91
Although a formalist interpretation of ‘public control’ in Article 11 might have
suggested that all activities not carried out by the government itself were private,
the Court instead opted for amore expansive understanding of ‘public’: Rutenberg’s
interests were characterized as a ‘public utility body’.92 This then provided a sufﬁ-
cient link between notions of ‘public control’ in Article 11 of the Mandate and the
89 Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, at 12.
90 Ibid., at 11.
91 Ibid., at 19.
92 ‘But it doesnot appear tobe correct tomaintain that theEnglish expression “public control” only covers cases
where the Government takes over and itself directs undertakings of one kind or another. The expression is
alsoused to indicate certain formsof action takenby theStatewith regard tootherwiseprivateundertakings’,
ibid., at 20. Cf. Judge Finlay,who argued thatArt. 11 required direct public control by the state andnot simply
the granting by the state of a concession for public utilities. Ibid., Judge Finlay, Dissenting Opinion, at 49.
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jurisdictional requirements of Article 26 and opened the dispute up to the Court’s
consideration on themerits in its 1925 and 1927 judgments.
Unsurprisingly, Britain argued in all three hearings that negotiations had not
been exhausted and that the dispute was not directly related to the application
or interpretation of the Mandate.93 Sir C. Hurst also employed the public/private
dichotomy to argue that the Court could not concern itself withmatters relating to
a (private) individual.94 Sir C. Hurst cautioned against rashly rushing to the PCIJ for
all manner of disputes; instead, the ‘arbitrationmovement is one which is bound to
make progress slowly’.95
In contrast to the formalist and realist tone employed by the British, Greece adop-
tedaﬂexibleandcontextualreadingof theCourt’s jurisdictionaswellas its role inthe
League system.Appealing to theCourt’s sense of justice and idealism, the arguments
of Greece’s Politis were a call to context as well as the creative application of the
law.While recognizing Britain’s overweening position inworld affairs, Politis asked
the Court to rise above power politics and entertain the claims of ‘un petit pays’.96
In reaction against British formalist overtures to deny jurisdiction, Greece charac-
terized international law as a ﬁeld free from the constraints found, for example, in
Roman law.97 The Court was persuaded by Politis’s stance and therefore assigned
no jurisdictional signiﬁcance to either the contested nationality of Mavrommatis
or the fact that one of the key treaties had not entered into force when proceedings
were initiated. As was the case with the speedy transformation of Mavrommatis’s
claims from theprivate to the public realm, so, too,was theCourt unconcernedwith
a raft of technical obstacles identiﬁed by Britain and theminority.98
93 Speech by Sir C. Hurst, Counsel for Britain, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series C,
No. 5, 4 September 1924, at 33; British Plea to Jurisdiction, at 439–40.
94 According to Douglas Hogg, ‘Few things can be worse for the dignity of the Court than that it should ﬁnd
itself involved in trying amultitude of causeswhich are, in effect, claims by private persons such as are dealt
with in the ordinary municipal courts but which are diverted to this tribunal because it happens that the
respondent is a sovereign State and that the claimant is a subject of some other Power’, Speech by Sir D. Hogg,
Counsel for Britain, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series C, No. 13, September
1927, at 20. In his separate opinion of 1924, Judge Bustamante also used the public/private device well to
argue that the case at handwas not of concern to the League at all. Thematter of Rutenberg concessions was
strictly private, not only because it rested on a relationship between Britain and an individual. Furthermore,
Judge Bustamante questioned the public and sovereign capacity of Britain in Palestine and drew a sharp
distinction between its powers as a Mandatory compared to full public control as enjoyed by sovereign
states.Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, Judge Bustamante, Dissenting Opinion, at 81–2.
95 Sir C. Hurst, supra note 93, at 41. Cf. Greece’s position in the 1925 hearings, where the Court’s involvement
in the Mavrommatis affair is lauded as ‘one further step up the hill of progress’. Also see Speech by Mr H.
Purchase,Counsel forGreece, Part II, SpeechesandDocumentsReadbefore theCourt, SeriesC,No. 7, February
1925, at 22.
96 Speech by Mr M. Politis, Counsel for Greece, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series
C, No. 5, 4 September 1924, at 43. Also see Speech by Mr H. Purchase, Counsel for Greece, Part II, Speeches
and Documents Read before the Court, Series C, No. 7, February 1925, at 155.
97 Politis, supra note 96, at 50. This argument reﬂects that of Lauterpacht in his consideration of private-
law analogies in international law. Although the mandate conjured up ideas of the (private-law) trust, its
creation through ‘international legislation’ and its remit transported it into the public realm. Generally, see
H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (with Special Reference to International
Arbitration) (1927), 156–9, 191–202.
98 Especially that the Protocol attached to the Treaty of Lausanne entered into force after Greece’s application.
Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, at 33. Cf. Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, Judge Moore, Dissenting
Opinion, at 57.
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Greece’s approach at the jurisdictional stage, however, cannot simply be read
as a mirror opposite to Britain’s strictly positivist, formalist stance. Greece, too,
turned to classicpositivist argumentswhen it called for the recognitionof subsisting
rights as createdbycontractbetween theOttomangovernmentandMavrommatis.99
Such undertakings, however, created not only legal effects, but moral ones: ‘Ces
contrats, comme tous autres droits acquis, le nouveau souverain doit les respecter
nonseulementparobligationle´gale,maisaussipardevoirmoral.’100Greece’squest to
‘internationalize’ itsdisputewithBritain thensimultaneouslyendorsedpositivism’s
penchant for sovereign consent yet denied positivism’s disavowal of morality: ‘non
d’apre`s lavolonte´d’unsouverain,maissur labasedudroit international,de l’e´quite´ et
la morale des nations’.101 Thus, we can see how varied and somewhat contradictory
were the methods of argument in ultimately convincing the Court to found its
jurisdiction.
Here, in the ﬁrst set of hearings, the Court was keen to exercise its role as legal
interpreter of theMandate System and, throughout the three proceedings, the cent-
ral issue revolved around the nature of Britain’s public control and ownership of
Palestine’s resources. Throughout the three hearings that traced the fortunes of
Mavrommatis in trying to afﬁrm his concessionary rights, the Court read the re-
quirements of Article 26 of theMandate in light of Article 11:
The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the
interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and,
subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to
provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of
the publicworks, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall
introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among
other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation
of the land.
TheAdministrationmay arrangewith the Jewish agencymentioned inArticle 4[102]
to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and
utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these
matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration.103
For the majority in the 1924 and 1925 decisions, the matter was straightforward:
subsisting international obligations to preserve valid Ottoman contracts would
override later concessions that had been granted under the exercise of ‘public con-
trol’. The Court chose not to take a restrictive view of ‘public control’ here, stating
99 ‘Le fait que la Palestine a cesse´ d’eˆtre une province ottomane pour eˆtre e´rige´e en Etat sous le mandat de la
Grande-Bretagne et avec un foyer national pour le peuple juif nemodiﬁe pas la situation juridiqe cre´e´ avant
la guere au proﬁt de M. Mavrommatis’, Greek Memorial, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the
Court, Series C, No. 5, 4 September 1924, at 105.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., at 107.
102 Art. 4 reads: ‘An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising
and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may
affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine,
and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the
country’.
103 Emphasis added.
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that the formation of policy, rather than direct control, was sufﬁcient to transform
the granting of a private contract into a public act.104
The validity of Mavrommatis’s various concessionary rights was assessed by the
Court in lightofBritain’sundertakingtomaintainOttomancontractsunderProtocol
XII of the Treaty of Lausanne (‘the Protocol’). Under Article 1 of the Protocol, the
contracting parties acknowledged that:
Concessionary contracts and subsequent agreements relating thereto, duly entered
into before the 29th October, 1914, between the Ottoman Government or any local
authority, on the one hand, and nationals (including Companies) of the Contracting
Powers, other than Turkey, on the other hand, are maintained.
As mentioned above, the fact that this instrument had not entered into force when
proceedings were commenced was not of import to the Court. Here, it chose a
ﬂexible approach to establish its jurisdiction in contrast to the formalist tones
employed especially by Judges Finlay, Moore, Oda, and Bustamante. As opposed to
its decision in the Lighthouses Case between France andGreece inwhich the formalities
of Ottoman ratiﬁcation were overlooked to uphold subsisting rights under Article
9 of the Protocol,105 the Court at least required the fulﬁlment of all formalities
before being able to consider a claim as attached to Article 11 of the Mandate.
Those concessions granted after the outbreak of war carried unspeciﬁed rights that
could not be considered under the Court’s limited jurisdictional remit. For the
concessionary rights duly compliant with Britain’s international obligations, the
Court then considered in its 1925 judgment whether the Mavrommatis case was
more amenable to Article 4, with its right of readaptation, or Article 6, which only
allowed for the dissolution of contracts and compensation.106 Mavrommatis could
onlymakea case for readaptation if he could showthat the concessionshadbeenput
into operation before 1923 and, despite strong British evidence of Mavrommatis’s
inaction, theCourt chose to distinguish between the commencement of application of
contracts versus their execution so that Mavrommatis’s more expansive rights could
be preserved.107
104 Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, at 19–24. At 20, the Court stated that ‘it does not appear to be correct
to maintain that the English expression “public control” only covers cases where the Government takes
over and itself directs undertakings of one kind or another. The expression is also used to indicate certain
forms of action taken by the State with regard to otherwise private undertakings’. Cf. Findley, who calls for a
strict interpretation of the provision, arguing that it requires actual direct public control by the Mandatory.
Mavrommatis (1924), supra note 2, Judge Findley, Dissenting Opinion, at 49. Also see Mavrommatis (1925),
supra note 2, at 27.
105 Lighthouses Case between France andGreece (France/Greece), PCIJ Rep., (1934) Series A/BNo. 62. It is interesting
to compare Judge Anzilotti’s dissenting opinion in this case, where he argues for a strict interpretation of
Art. 9 of Protocol XII before any subsisting rights can be recognized.
106 Art. 4 of the Protocol states: ‘Subject to the provisions of Article 6, the provisions of the contracts and
subsequent agreements referred to in Article 1 shall, by agreement, and as regards both parties, be put into
conformitywith theneweconomic conditions’. Art. 6 provides: ‘Beneﬁciaries under concessionary contracts
referred to in Article 1, which have not, on the date of this Protocol, begun to be put into operation, cannot
avail themselves of theprovisions of this Protocol relating to re-adaptation. These contractsmaybedissolved
on the requestof theconcessionairemadewithin sixmonths fromthecoming into forceof theTreatyofPeace
signed this day. In such case the concessionaire will be entitled, if there is ground for it, to such indemnity
in respect of the survey and investigation work as, in default of agreement between the parties, shall be
considered equitable by the experts provided for in this Protocol.’
107 Mavrommatis (1925), supra note 2, at 47–8.
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In contrast to its ﬂexible approach to jurisdiction and the meaning of ‘public
control’,however, inits1925judgment, theCourtremaineddeaf toGreece’snarrative
of the increasingly difﬁcult conditions faced by Mavrommatis; the Court was only
prepared to consider context so far andcouldnot abandon the formalist requirement
of direct proof of the investor’s loss.108 While Britain was at pains to paint its
dealings with Mavrommatis as conforming to strict legal standards, Greece evoked
a more nuanced and complex tale of colonial mismanagement and favouritism
that reconﬁgured the allocation of wealth and power for the core as well as the
periphery. In particular, the changes brought about through the Mandate regime
led to a situation that precludedMavrommatis from implementing his concessions,
with even the bankwithdrawing its backing in the knowledge of British preferences
for Rutenberg’s concessions.109 The story narrated by Greece highlighted how the
quest for continuitywasultimatelydashedbythe changeswroughtunder theMandate.
Here, we see how public power could be used to thwart private rights.
Again, in the last hearing of 1927, one of themain devices employed by both sides
was the public/private dichotomy, especially in relation to the contested public role
played by Rutenberg and his relationshipwith the Jewish Agency.110 Britain tried to
bury the international legal signiﬁcance of the Rutenberg concession grants under
a layer of private interests. The Rutenberg concession was simply an agreement
with not only an individual, but an individual with no ofﬁcial connections to the
Jewish Agency. The details of Rutenberg’s relationship with the British and the
Jewish Agency are not important here.111 What is far more important, however,
is the way in which the disadvantageous position Mavrommatis confronted was
denied as being of any public, and thus international legal, signiﬁcance, despite the
fact that these conditions were instituted through the Mandate regime itself.112
While Greece’s pleadings at times verged on themelodramatic, Britain’s invocation
of the public/private dichotomy to distinguish the actions of the Jewish Agency, the
Palestine Administration, and the Colonial Ofﬁce in London contradicted many of
its ofﬁcial statements and tried to shift responsibility elsewhere.113 In relation to
theMandate-sanctioned relationship between the Palestine Administration and the
Jewish Agency, the Court appreciated its special nature and thus characterized the
108 Ibid., at 42–5.
109 Ibid., at 17.
110 By reading the terms of Art. 4, the Court characterized the Jewish Agency as a ‘public body’. Mavrommatis
(1924), supra note 2, at 21.
111 Britain repeatedly argued that Rutenberg was not a representative of the Jewish Agency, which was strictly
true, but denies how his close connections facilitated the granting of his concession. Speech by Sir D. Hogg,
Counsel for Britain, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court, Series C, No. 7, February 1925,
at 128.
112 ‘The fact that a number of circumstances have combined to lessen the value of the concessions does not
giveM.Mavrommatis any claim against the British Government. The fact even that the political situation in
Palestine has been so altered since 1914 that the concessions are likely to be less proﬁtable – if it be a fact –
does not give legal claim to damages against the British Government’, ibid., at 100 (emphasis added).
113 For example, in the 1925 pleadings, Sir Hogg declared that ‘it is not the British government which has
acquired the territory of Palestine. But the territory has been acquired by the Administration of Palestine,
and the position of the British government arises only under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations’, Speech by Sir D. Hogg, Counsel for Britain, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read before the Court,
Series C, No. 7, February 1925, at 101.
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latter as a public body. In relation to the unfavourable investment climate, however,
for those individuals lacking the backing of the Jewish Agency like Rutenberg,114
the Court was unable to grant any speciﬁc relief in relation to the ‘hostile’ actions of
the British government.115
Perhaps eager to free itself of the matter, by its third and ﬁnal judgment, the
Court employed an especially formalist reading of Mavrommatis’s rights regarding
his readapted concessions and found that it no longer had jurisdiction. As in the
ﬁrst two hearings, the Court focused on whether Britain had exercised its power
of ‘public control’ under Article 11 in relation to new contracts created with Mav-
rommatis. Unlike the Rutenberg concessions considered before, here, the Court
determined that Mavrommatis’s concessions were the result of a purely ‘admin-
istrative’ decision with a private individual and did not amount to an exercise of
full public power under Article 11.116 Such a stance conﬂicted with a number of
judges in the minority who took a more expansive reading of the nature of ‘public
control’ as well as the ‘public’ role of the Jewish Agency in the development of the
Mandate.117 In addition, Judge Caloyanni in dissent cautioned against relying on
traditional notions of ‘public authority’, arguing instead that the Court needed to be
ﬂexible in the face of the sui generis nature of theMandate system.118 Because of the
special international character of the Mandates, it was crucial for the PCIJ to ensure
a degree of conformity in the exercise of the total power granted to Mandatories.119
He called for a ‘general’ interpretation of the Court’s jurisdiction so that it could
continue to ensure respect for the terms of the Mandate as was afﬁrmed in its 1924
decision.120
Ultimately, through a ﬂexible deployment of formalist or contextualistmethods,
the Court had a signiﬁcant degree of discretion in deciding when and how it would
or would not intervene in the running of Mandate Palestine. Although the Bench
and the Bar were anxious to examine certain aspects of Article 11’s terms, such a
focus came at the cost of a broader reading of the Mandate’s underlying dynamics.
For example and in relation to Article 11, no consideration was given to the mean-
ing of ‘community’ or ‘needs of the country’ and even ‘development’ was treated
114 Described by Politis as ‘Je pretends que le Gouvernement britannique a exproprie´, en fait, M. Mavrommatis
parce qu’il a cre´e´, par les concessions accorde´es a` M. Rutenberg et par la politique inaugure´e en Palestine a`
l’e´gard des Sionistes, une situation de fait qui rend impossible aujoud’hui a`M.Mavrommatis la jouissance de
ses droits’, Speech by N. Politis, Counsel for Greece, Part II, Speeches and Documents Read Before the Court,
Series C, No. 7, February 1925, at 76.
115 Mavrommatis (1927), supra note 2, at 22.
116 Ibid., at 19–20.
117 For example, see ibid., JudgeAltamira, DissentingOpinion, at 37. It is interesting to note how JudgeAltamira
adopts a similar line of reasoning later in the 1934 Oscar Chinn case, which considered whether a de facto
monopoly created by the Belgian government in the Congo had infringed on the rights of a private investor
and businessman, Mr Chinn. As in the case of its 1927 majority judgment, the Court chose to disavow a
broader, contextual reading to hold that there was no conﬂict between the Belgian policy and Belgium’s
international obligations vis-a`-vis freedom of commerce and navigation on the Congo River. In contrast,
Judge Altamira looks at the substantive effects of the policy to hold that conditions of inequality amount to
a conﬂict. The Oscar Chinn case (Britain/Belgium), PCIJ Rep., (1934) Series A/B No. 63.
118 Mavrommatis (1927), ibid., Judge Caloyanni, Dissenting Opinion, at 52–4.
119 Ibid., Judge Nyholm, Dissenting Opinion, at 26.
120 Ibid., at 30–1.
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uncritically – this despite the fact that the Jewish Agency was accorded a ‘public’
role aswell as public recognition in the context of theMandate document. As for the
majority of the population concerned, the PalestinianArabs and, in contrast toMav-
rommatis’s (indirect) standing, thepublic/privatedistinctioncreated in theMandate
document prevented their perspectives from being heard by the PCIJ. Thus, we see
that, although the PCIJ precluded ‘“private” lives from the sphere, the international
legal system strongly inﬂuences the spheres it deems private’.121 As was the case for
‘native’ concerns before the PMC,122 the PCIJ was institutionally blocked from any
direct engagement with Mandate populations. Substantively, though, even when
given the chance to consider howwealth and power were reconﬁgured in the terri-
tory, the Court ultimately chose to remain silent. In failing to question inequalities
at the heart of theMandate system, then, the PCIJwas complicit in denying not only
Mavrommatis’s broader claims, but also the economic and political rights of those
‘peripheral’ populations in Palestine.
4. CONCLUSION
In tracing the fortunes of Mavrommatis within the context of the Mandate system,
a number of themes have emerged that broadly support recent critical work on the
ruptures and continuities for peoples in the periphery during the era of the League.
Here, I sought to show how Arab peoples under either protectorate or Mandatory
regimes remained excluded from formal participation in the international system.
Although, of course, the Mandate framework brought with it new guarantees for
native populations, we have seen how in fact such dividends were far from lib-
erating. Various terms of the Palestine Mandate did indeed allow the Court more
grounds on which to base its jurisdiction, but such provisions can also be read as
simply allowing for greater judicial endorsement of underlying inequalities in the
distribution of wealth and power under British rule. Situated between the terms
of the Mandate and the Court as well as between Britain and Palestine’s subject
population, Mavrommatis’s fortunes encapsulate the ways in which international
law as spoken within the PCIJ constructed and reconstructed membership within
the core, theperiphery, and the semi-peripheryduring the interwarperiod.Mavrom-
matis’s odyssey to various locales of the core, such as London and TheHague, would
ultimately end on the fringes of the former Ottoman world, somewhere between
Jerusalem and the Aegean.
Within the conﬁnes of the courtroom, those at the Bench and the Bar drew on
a number of innovative devices to support their arguments, whether through a
reliance on the public/private distinction or through formalist/contextualist read-
ings of the relationship between law and fact. The use of these tools allowed each
speaker to conﬁgure her own particular vision of the role of international law
121 H.Charlesworth, ‘WorldsApart: Public/PrivateDistinctions in InternationalLaw’, inM.Thornton (ed.),Public
and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (1995), 243–60, at 250.
122 Anghie, supra note 10, at 175.
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vis-a`-vis the governance of ‘backward’ peoples. We saw that, despite these many
rhetorical possibilities, time and again, the periphery remained very much a si-
lent interlocutor in the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that peripheral
peoples were not deeply affected by the legal arguments endorsed and validated
within the PCIJ. Judicial oversight combined with structural inequalities at the
heart of the Mandate for Palestine would have enduring effects past the dawn of
decolonization.
